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A New American Dilemma?:
U.S. Constitutionalism vs. International
Human Rights
STANLEY N. KATz*
"Americans don't see it this way, but the country with the most puzzling
human rights record in the world is their own. '
My objective is to explore the historical reasons that serious and
well-intentioned Americans disagree so profoundly on what human
rights are, and what the role of my country might be in enforcing the
emerging international law of human rights. I am not so interested in the
political and social reasons for American hesitance to embrace the inter-
national law of human rights - temerity, isolationism, arrogance, impe-
rialism, mean-spiritedness and more - as I am in the underlying
elements of our constitutional history and structure that have made it so
hard for our nation "to do the right thing" by way of constitutional
human rights, even for those of us favorably inclined to do so.
1. THE MULTILATERAL TREATY SYSTEM
The 1787 Constitution does not say much about international law.
The most obvious reference is the delegation to Congress of the power
to "define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations,"2 but
until recently this was restricted to its textual pairing with the power to
"define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas." 3
The normal method for committing the United States to international
norms has, of course, been by the formal adoption of treaties and cove-
nants. The President has the "Power, by and with the Advice and Con-
sent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators
present concur."4 This is a potentially sweeping power, for it is ampli-
fied by Article VI, Section 2, which says that treaties made "under the
Authority of the United States," like the Constitution and statutes made
* Lecturer with the rank of Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International
Affairs, Princeton University. The author wishes to acknowledge the major role played in this
research project by his colleague and research assistant, Simon P. Stacey, a Princeton University
graduate student in Politics.
1. Michael Ignatieff, No Exceptions?, 1:1 LEGAL AFF. 59 (2002).
2. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
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in accordance with it, "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."5
Are there any limits on the treaty-making power? Hurst Hannum
notes that:
It is well-established that a self-executing treaty (or a non-self-exe-
cuting treaty implemented by Congress) supersedes all inconsistent
state and prior laws, as well as prior inconsistent federal statutes.
Although the subject matter of treaties is in theory limited "to all
proper subjects of negotiation between our government and the gov-
ernments of other nations," neither this oft-quoted phrase nor subse-
quent cases suggest any practical limitations on the matters which the
President and Senate may appropriately address by treaty. The only
clear exceptions to this power are those acts which are specifically
reserved in the Constitution to Congress or the President, e.g., the
power to tax or to declare war, and which could not be accomplished
by treaty.6
The most effective limitation on the applicability of international
human rights treaties has been the doctrine that multilateral human rights
treaties are non-self-executing, and thus not directly enforceable.
Although there is no U.S. Supreme Court case on point, both state and
federal courts have followed the doctrine of the California Supreme
Court in Sei Fujii v. State,7 which held that human rights covenants of
the United Nations are not self-executing.8 Of course, as Hannum also
notes, "[t]he self-executing versus non-self-executing distinction is per-
haps less relevant than it might appear, given the poor record of U.S.
ratification of international human rights treaties." 9 We certainly cannot
execute treaties we do not ratify, or human rights treaties that we emas-
culate with "reservations, understandings and declarations."
Let us not forget that the stakes are high. Paul Lauren makes the
point that the entire notion of the law of nations was profoundly trans-
formed in the decades after the promulgation of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights.
Under traditional and heavily entrenched international law, only
states possessed legal standing and enjoyed recognized rights. This
horizontal system between sovereign states ruled supreme, and indi-
viduals remained outside. But with the advent of this whole body of
legal instruments in the form of binding covenants and conventions
with monitoring bodies, this system has increasingly changed into a
more vertical arrangement, whereby individual men, women and chil-
5. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
6. HURST HANNUM, MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (1985).
7. 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
8. Id.
9. HANNUM, supra note 6, at 6-7.
[Vol. 58:323
A NEW AMERICAN DILEMMA?
dren find themselves being increasingly transformed into legitimate
subjects of international law to be legally respected, and entitled to
the protection of their rights against violations by their own govern-
ments, as well as by other states.' °
Thus the currently emerging human rights regime not only threatens
state sovereignty, but also promises to empower citizens of laggard
states both to imagine and seek recognition of rights not protected at
home. As I will argue later, this is a peculiarly unwelcome notion in the
United States, whether we are "laggard" or not.
In fact, the specter of the enforcement of foreign rights norms for
our citizens has haunted some Americans throughout most of our
national history. We were, after all, among the last of the "civilized"
nations to join the international movement to abandon the system of
human bondage. Even as late as the negotiations to create the League of
Nations, President Wilson fought the efforts of the Japanese and others
to introduce a clause into the League Charter declaring a right to racial
equality. However, to be fair, it might have been because Wilson knew
the Senate would never ratify the League Treaty if such a clause were
included. Senator James Reed of Missouri, during the debate about U.S.
entrance into the League, blurted out, "Think of submitting questions
involving the very life of the United States to a tribunal on which a
nigger from Liberia, a nigger from Honduras, a nigger from India...
each have votes equal to that of the great United States."' 1 Or, more
diplomatically, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts declared,
"We do not want a narrow alley of escape from jurisdiction of the
League. We want to prevent any jurisdiction whatever."' 2 But I do not
want to put too much emphasis on the World War I experience. I want
instead to concentrate on the history of human rights since the Second
World War, and briefly review how far they have come since then, and
what progress they have made and failed to make in this country.
As the West caught its first glimpses of the horrors of Nazism, it
seemed clear that a conscientious response to totalitarianism required the
energetic defense of the rights to liberty and security that had been so
thoroughly violated during the first four decades of the twentieth cen-
tury. As early as 1941, Franklin Roosevelt had called for a world
"formed upon four essential freedoms;"' 3 and shortly after America
entered the war, the Allies made human rights an explicit goal of the
war, declaring "complete victory over their enemies [essential] to pre-
10. PAUL GORDON LAUREN, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: VISIONS
SEEN 260 (1998).
11. Id. at 125.
12. Id.
13. 87 CONG. REc. 1 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1941) (speech to Congress by Franklin D. Roosevelt).
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serve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other
lands." 14
The idea of international human rights first surfaced in the United
States at the American Law Institute, the country's most prestigious
national legal association. In 1942, the ALl appointed a committee of
lawyers and political scientists to examine the world's cultures in order
to compile a tentative international bill of rights. The committee
reported to the ALI governing body in 1944, but the Council decided
against further attempts to draft an international bill of rights. The
Council explained its refusal by noting that the representatives from dif-
ferent nations did not agree on the rights to be included and, signifi-
cantly, by the recognition that "the imposition of positive duties upon
the state to enforce the rights will be questioned."1 5 Probably more
important, the Director of the ALI noted that further discussion of the
international bill of rights "might and possibly would draw us into what
could not but be regarded as a political discussion, something which it is
imperative that we do not do."16
Nevertheless, when the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Brit-
ain and China met at Dumbarton Oaks in late 1944 to negotiate the char-
ter of an international organization to replace the League of Nations,
their enthusiasm for human rights was already waning, and all except
China - tragically ironic, given the country's subsequent record -
were united in opposition to any meaningful human rights provisions.
The Senate had already resolved that the United States' membership in
any such international organization should be conditioned on a strong
domestic jurisdiction clause. It is no surprise, then, that the official
briefing that our delegates took to the San Francisco Peace Conference
contained not a single agenda item related to human rights.
The Charter of the United Nations signed by forty-four nations at
San Francisco in 1945 took greater account of human rights than the
United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain had intended. But, it
was the vocal support for human rights by America's own civil society
- several U.S. non-governmental organizations were shortsightedly
invited to the San Francisco Conference as consultants by the U.S.
Department of State - that forced it to take the lead in giving human
rights their prominent place in the U.N. Charter. 7 Prominent, but still
not enforceable. National sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction contin-
14. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR GLOBAL
JUSTICE 23 (New Press 2000) (1999).
15. Proceedings of 1944 ALl Annual Meeting, 21 A.L.I. PRoc. 33 (1944).
16. Id.
17. See ROBERTSON, supra note 14, at 24.
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ued to stand in the way of enforceability. And so emerged Article 2(7)
of the Charter: "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within
the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require Members to submit
such matter to settlement."18
American ambivalence toward human rights continued even as
Eleanor Roosevelt was chosen as chairperson of the preparatory com-
mittee established to draft recommendations for the U.N.'s Commission
on Human Rights, and as she was then unanimously elected chair of the
Commission itself. Enforceability continued to be a sticking point for
the United States. In 1947, as her Commission deliberated about an
international bill of rights, Roosevelt received instructions from our gov-
ernment that these deliberations should lead to no more than a declara-
tion of principles, and that any discussions about mechanisms for
enforcement "should be kept on a tentative level and should not involve
any commitments by this Government. '" 9 Thus it was that the product
that emerged in December 1948 was the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and not a binding convention. Nevertheless, as Geoffrey
Robertson has noted, the Declaration was "an imperishable statement
that has inspired more than 200 international treaties, conventions and
declarations, and the bills of rights found in almost every national con-
stitution adopted since the war."2
Although the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was non-
binding, Article 28 did decree that "[e]veryone is entitled to a social and
international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration can be fully realized."'" So in 1948, the U.N. General
Assembly set the Commission on Human Rights to work drafting a
treaty that would require the domestic law of ratifying states to guaran-
tee the human rights of their citizens. Yet in 1953, Eleanor Roosevelt
was recalled from the Commission on Human Rights although she still
had two years of her term remaining. Secretary of State John Foster
Dulles announced that the United States would not become a party to
any U.N. human rights treaty. Perhaps we should not be surprised by
this turn of events. The practical reasons for joining the United Nations,
combined with the efflorescence of democratic ideals following World
War II, had helped the proponents of ratification of the U.N. Charter
avoid the disaster of the League experience. But the internationalist
enthusiasm of the postwar period soon gave way to the historic fear of
18. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
19. LAUREN, supra note 10, at 232.
20. ROBERTSON, supra note 14, at 29.
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 28.
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foreign entanglements with the onset of McCarthyism and a resurgence
of neo-isolationism in the 1950s.
This reaction was most overtly expressed in the efforts of Ohio
Senator John Bricker and other isolationist Midwestern senators to intro-
duce what came to be known as the Bricker Amendment in 1953. The
three sections of his proposed amendment were a straightforward
attempt to enable Congress to prevent the use of treaties to override the
Constitution and statutory law:
Sec. 1. A provision of a treaty which conflicts with this Constitution
shall not be of any force or effect.
Sec. 2. A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence
of treaty.
Sec. 3. Congress shall have power to regulate all executive and other
agreements with any foreign power or international organization. All
such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on trea-
ties by this article.22
Beyond simple constitutional conservatism, Bricker was especially
antagonistic toward the draft U.N. covenants on human rights. He "char-
acterized the covenant as 'a Covenant on Human Slavery,' a legalization
of 'the most vicious restrictions of dictators,' a 'legal basis for the most
repressive measures of atheistic tyranny,' 'an attempt to repeal the Bill
of Rights,' a threat to freedom of religion and 'a blueprint for tyr-
anny.' ,23 For Bricker, the Amendment was necessitated by the pres-
sures of the Cold War:
The Communist drive for world domination, although a divisive
influence in one sense, inspires the non-Communist world to seek
increased safety in collective security arrangements, economic as
well as military in character. All these influences have led in turn to
proposals to curb the power of the nation-state by subordinating it to
some measure of control by supra-national organizations.24
Although the administration saw the Amendment primarily as an attack
on the constitutional foreign policy powers of the President, for Bricker
there was something much larger at stake:
What this amendment would in essence do is to keep the rights of the
American people in the spiritual realm and not place them in the tem-
poral power of an international government which is controlled by
countries which are totalitarian in their philosophy and seem to have
22. John W. Bricker, Making Treaties and Other International Agreements, 289 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 136-37 (1953).
23. Natalie Hevener Kaufman & David Whiteman, Opposition to Human Rights Treaties in
the United States Senate: The Legacy of the Bricker Amendment, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 318 (1988).
24. Bricker, supra note 22, at 134.
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no concept of the God-given inalienable rights that the people of
America enjoy.25
Or, more to my point, as Paul Lauren explains:
Bricker decided to introduce legislation demanding that the United
States withdraw from all covenants, conventions and treaties emerg-
ing from the United Nations having anything to do with human
rights. "My purpose in offering this resolution," he declared to his
colleagues, "is to bury the so called covenant on human rights so
deep that no one holding office will ever dare to attempt its resurrec-
tion." He went on to describe the proposed covenant as "completely
foreign to American law and tradition" and described it as nothing
less than a "U.N. Blueprint for Tyranny." Then, on the floor of the
Senate itself Bricker stridently announced to his colleagues: "I do not
want any of the international groups, and especially the group headed
by Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt, which has drafted the covenant of Human
Rights, to betray the fundamental, inalienable, and God-given rights
of American citizens enjoyed under the Constitution. That is really
what I am driving at."
26
I do not want to exaggerate the importance of the Bricker idea. The
proposed amendment never made it out of the Senate. Most of its sup-
porters were among the minority who supported Senator Joseph McCar-
thy against censure, and they represented a small, extremely
conservative, isolated and isolationist minority in the Eisenhower
Republican Party. President Eisenhower himself said in January 1954,
"I am unalterably opposed to the Bricker Amendment.... Adoption...
in its present form would be notice to our friends as well as our enemies
abroad that our country intends to withdraw from its leadership in world
affairs. The inevitable reaction would be of major proportions."2 7 On
the other hand, Dulles announced that the Eisenhower administration
would not submit the two U.N. treaties on human rights to the Senate as
such treaties "should, or lawfully can, be used as devices to circumvent
the constitutional procedures established in relation to what are essen-
tially matters of domestic concern." 28 My point is simply that Bricker,
who couched his opposition in constitutional terms, touched a deep
nerve in the historic American attitude toward U.S. participation in the
international human rights movement through the treaty mechanism. In
retrospect, his position seems quite weak constitutionally, since he
sought an amendment out of fear that the existing constitutional struc-
25. Kaufman & Whiteman, supra note 23, at 316.
26. LAUREN, supra note 10, at 246 (internal citations omitted).
27. See Stephen A. Garrett, Foreign Policy and the American Constitution: The Bricker
Amendment in Contemporary Perspective, 16 INT'L STUDIES Q. 187, 198 (1972).
28. Id. at 202.
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ture did not provide a sufficient barrier against norm-creation by treaty.
But the Bricker episode reveals an underlying sensitivity in our constitu-
tional tradition with respect to human rights.
The United States, on the whole, remained aloof from U.N. human
rights treaties for several decades. We played almost no role in the for-
mulation of either the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, which, along with the Universal Declaration, constitute the Inter-
national Bill of Rights. We also stayed well away from these documents
when they were opened for signature in 1966. We refused to ratify the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, which has been open for signature since 1948. There were some
minor exceptions. The United States did participate fairly actively in the
U.N. Subcommission on Discrimination that produced the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in
1965,29 and acceded to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women
in 1976 (although given that women already enjoyed the right to vote in
the United States, this did not mean much).
Real engagement with the growing body of treaties had to wait
until the late 1970s. President Carter signed the Civil Covenant in 1977,
and sent it on to the Senate for ratification the following year, along with
three other human rights treaties with a series of crippling reservations.
In his letter of transmittal, Carter wrote, "the great majority of the sub-
stantive provisions of these four treaties are entirely consistent with the
letter and spirit of the United States Constitution and laws."' 30 The Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee held three days of hearings on these
treaties in 1979, but reached no conclusion and did not report favorably
on any of the treaties. Then, events intervened to stymie further pro-
gress. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iran hostage crisis
prevented final consideration of the treaties before President Reagan
took office in 1981. The new administration displayed no interest in rati-
fying the Civil Covenant, and instead chose to focus on ratifying the
Genocide Convention, which had been before the Senate since President
Truman transmitted it almost forty years earlier. The ratification of the
Genocide Convention occurred in 1988 with the attachment of an
encompassing reservation by the United States "[t]hat nothing in the
Convention requires or authorizes legislation or other action by the
29. Clyde Ferguson, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: WITH OR WITHOUT
RESERVATION, 41-42 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981).
30. Christina Cema, The United States and the American Convention on Human Rights:
Prospects and Problems of Ratification, in THE UNITED STATES AND HUMAN RIGHTS: LOOKING
INWARD AND OUTWARD 96 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2000).
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United States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United
States as interpreted by the United States." 3 1
In August 1991, President George H.W. Bush urged the Committee
to reconsider the Civil Covenant, which it did in November. After a
unanimous vote the following March, the Commission favorably
reported the treaty to the full Senate for formal approval, which was
granted in April 1992, along with the customary package of reservations,
understandings and declarations. October 1994 was, however, a good
month for the U.N. treaties in the United States. That month saw the
ratification of two further treaties - the Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the
Reagan administration had laid much of the groundwork for this ratifica-
tion) and the International Covenant on Elimination of all Forms of
Racial Discrimination. As usual, reservations, understandings and dec-
larations (thirteen in all) accompanied both. But other important human
rights treaties, such as the Economic Covenant and the Convention on
the Rights of the Child, remain unratified by the United States. The
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Members of Their Families remains unsigned by the
United States. On July 31, 2002, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, but the full Senate (having passed to
Republican control) has yet to act. The current Bush administration
opposes ratification of this Convention, and has prepared a package of
reservations, understandings and declarations (RUDs) in the event the
Convention is passed. The result is that the United States participates in
the U.N. treaty/covenant human rights regime in a partial, inconsistent
and ambivalent fashion, and that such international documents do not
constitute rules of law for American courts charged with protecting simi-
lar individual and group rights domestically.
Even when the United States does ratify a human rights treaty, the
standard is to have RUDs accompany the treaty. However, opinions
about the significance of RUDs are mixed. Some commentators argue
that it is only by means of RUDs that the problems that human rights
treaties pose for the U.S. constitutional system can be met. Curtis A.
Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, for instance, identify three sorts of chal-
lenges: (1) challenges of substance - tensions between treaty provi-
sions and U.S. constitutional rights or democratically popular practices;
(2) challenges of scope - the reach of treaties into civil, political and
31. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (ratified by the United States of America with reservations Nov. 25, 1988)
(available at http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part-boo/ivboo/iv_ .html).
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
cultural life and the openness of their language means that if they were
treated as law "they would generate significant litigation and uncertainty
regarding the application and validity of numerous domestic laws;" and
(3) challenges of structure - the United States' constitutional practice is
that the House of Representatives initiates the kind of law contained in
human rights treaties, and federalist principles suggest that "some mat-
ters should be regulated by state, rather than federal, officials. 3 a But
RUDs, in Bradley and Goldsmith's opinion, successfully address each of
these challenges. 33 With regard to the first, RUDs allow treaty-makers
to avoid binding the United States to certain treaty provisions; declara-
tions of non-self-execution and federalism understandings handle the
scope and structure challenges by ensuring that treaties have legal effect
only when implemented by legislation and that some provisions may be
implemented by state and local governments rather than by the federal
government. 34 Bradley and Goldsmith maintain that RUDs have been a
part of the U.S. treaty-making process since the founding and that the
Supreme Court has on several occasions referred positively to the power
of conditional assent. Finally, they argue, "genuine and significant pro-
gress towards involvement in the international human rights system"
that the United States has made would not have taken place "without the
RUDs as a condition for U.S. ratification.
35
Other commentators, however, are less charitable toward RUDs.
Louis Henkin, for example, criticizes them on several counts. While he
concedes that treaties are subject to constitutional limitations and that
reservations that "avoid an obligation that the United States could not
carry out because of constitutional limitations" are appropriate, he
claims that reservations are often entered not to avoid constitutional dif-
ficulties, but to preserve U.S. law as it is.36 He is especially critical of
federalism understandings, arguing that there "are no significant 'state's
rights' limitations on the treaty power, ' 37 and of non-self-execution dec-
larations, which in his opinion "serve to immunize the United States
from external judgment, '38 and may be unconstitutional, given that
"Article VI of the Constitution provides expressly for lawmaking by
treaty: treaties are declared to be the supreme law of the land."' 39 My
32. Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional
Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 400-01 (2000).
33. Id. at 401.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 459.
36. See Louis Henkin, "U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator
Bricker, 89 Am. J. INT'L. L. 341, 342 (1995).
37. Id. at 345.
38. Id. at 346.
39. Id. (But for a very forceful response to Henkin, see generally John C. Yoo, Globalism and
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own observation is that at least in part as a result of RUDs, even the
Civil Covenant does not play a meaningful role in American litigation.
RUDs and shamefully unsigned treaties apart, it is not the case that
our country has abandoned the use of the concept of international human
rights. Indeed, as Kenneth Cmiel has noted, Congress passed a series of
statutes in the early 1970s that required monitoring of the adherence of
other countries to human rights norms as a condition for U.S. military
and financial foreign aid.4 ° Since then, we have increased the number of
such statutes, and since 1977 the State Department has annually issued
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to permit judgments to be
made on the eligibility of listed countries to receive U.S. aid. By 2002,
the State Department was reporting on 196 countries, including many
not being considered for aid. In 1976, Congress legislated the creation
of a Coordinator of Human Rights (later upgraded to Assistant Secre-
tary) in the State Department, and added a Senior Advisor for Women's
Rights in 1994. We also regularly (at least rhetorically) condition our
international economic policy to human foreign human rights compli-
ance - whether to grant Most Favored Nation trade status to China or to
agree to its admission to the World Trade Organization, for example.
But when domestic or international human rights nongovernmental orga-
nizations monitor our compliance with human rights norms, the U.S.
government response is usually one of outrage. Our constitutional tradi-
tion has conditioned us to believe that our historic rights and norms are
sufficient and defensible in the face of external critique.
2. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
Are there other legal bases for U.S. participation in the international
human rights system? One alternative to the treaty mechanism would be
for the United States to accept as domestically enforceable the relevant
customary international law - that portion of international law that
does not derive from treaties or formal agreements. But here, too, the
United States has been reluctant to commit itself to international human
rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court announced as long ago as 1900, in The
Paquete Habana,4" that customary international law is "part of our law,
and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending on it are
the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955 (1999)).
40. Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, 86 J. AM.
HIST. 1231, 1233-35 (1999).
41. 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
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duly presented for their determination."42 This is a strong affirmation of
the immediate applicability of customary international law to domestic
adjudication that seems to authorize the federal courts to act:
For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling execu-
tive or legislative act or decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these to the works
of jurists and commentators .... Such works are resorted to by judi-
cial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning
what the law ought to be, but for trust in or evidence of what the law
actually is.
4 3
There have been, now and then, other similar statements from the Court.
Well before The Paquete Habana, in Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy,' Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "[A]n act of Congress ought
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains."45 In 1980, in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 6 Judge
Irving Kaufman of the Second Circuit, having examined the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and other international instruments, fol-
lowed Paquete Habana in determining that evolving principles of cus-
tomary international law had declared torture to be a violation of human
rights.47
In a contemporaneous case, Pedro Rodriguez Fernandez, a Cuban
immigrant in the 1980 Mariel "freedom flotilla" to the United States,
challenged an Immigration and Naturalization Service order mandating
his indefinite detainment and deportation on the grounds that he had
previously been convicted of a crime in Cuba. He based his claim on
the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.48 The federal District Court of
Kansas ordered the government to free Rodriguez Fernandez on the
grounds that his indeterminate imprisonment constituted "arbitrary
detention" and was a "violation of customary international law."49 The
Court reasoned that repeated international agreements, while initially
non-binding domestically, ultimately become binding as customary
international law. Therefore, if a particular violation, such as Rodriguez
Fernandez's detention, "is found to be of mutual, and not merely of sev-
eral, concern among nations," it can be "judicially remedial as a viola-
42. Id. at 700.
43. Robert J. Martineau, Jr., Interpreting the Constitution: The Use of International Human
Rights Norms, 5 HUM. RTs. Q. 87, 96 (1983).
44. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
45. Id. at 118.
46. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
47. Martineau, supra note 43, at 96-97.
48. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787, 789 (D. Kan. 1980).
49. Id. at 800.
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tion of international law." 50
Subsequently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the
statutes in question in a manner that required Rodriguez Fernandez's
release.5' In dicta, the judges also considered the constitutional question
of whether his release was required by the due process protections
afforded under the Fifth Amendment, considering principles of interna-
tional law in the process: "It seems proper then to consider international
law principles for notions of fairness as to the propriety of holding aliens
in detention. No principle of international law is more fundamental than
the concept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprison-
ment."52 On these grounds, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Rodriguez
Fernandez would have been entitled to release, as this would be "consis-
tent with accepted international law principles that individuals are to be
free from arbitrary imprisonment," 53 as well as with "the statutory treat-
ment of deportable resident aliens and with the constitutional principles
. . . [of due process]."54 While the District Court and the Court of
Appeals reached the same result through a consideration of customary
international law, the District Court employed a binding approach,
whereas the Court of Appeals used a persuasive one.
There is little recent federal case law to suggest that either has
gained widespread acceptance in U.S. courts. There are, however, some
signs that federal courts are beginning to take foreign judicial opinions
more seriously than in the past. In his dissenting opinion of the denial of
certiorari in Knight v. Florida,55 Justice Breyer considered the practice
of foreign courts with respect to certain death penalty cases as persua-
sive authority, arguing that the Supreme Court "has long considered as
relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in
roughly comparable circumstances."56 Such opinions, he contended, are
"useful even though not binding."57  Taking a more mainstream
approach, Justice Thomas dismissed Breyer's analysis out of hand, not-
ing, "Indeed, were there any such support in our own jurisprudence, it
would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the
50. Id. at 798.
51. Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d. 1382 (10t Cir. 1981).
52. Id. at 1388.
53. Id. at 1390.
54. Id.
55. 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 997.
57. Id. at 998.
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Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council. ' 8
In a footnote in Atkins v. Virginia,59 Justice Stevens cited a Euro-
pean Union amicus curiae brief as evidence that "within the world com-
munity, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by
mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved. 6 ° Ste-
vens' use of international opinion provoked Chief Justice Rehnquist to
respond that he failed "to see ...how the views of other countries
regarding the punishment of their citizens provide any support for the
"161Court's ultimate determination, given that the Court has "explicitly
rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of other countries could
'serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that [a]
practice is accepted among our people ' ' 62 More colorfully, Justice
Scalia asserted, "But the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to
fabricate 'national consensus' must go it its appeal (deservedly relegated
to a footnote) to the views of assorted professional and religious organi-
zations, members of the so-called 'world community,' and respondents
to opinion polls. I agree with the Chief Justice that the views of profes-
sional and religious organizations and the results of opinion polls are
irrelevant. Equally irrelevant are the practices of the 'world commu-
nity,' whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our
people.63
Scalia then repeated his previous conviction. "We must never for-
get that it is a Constitution for the United States of America that we are
expounding.... [W]here there is not first a settled consensus among our
own people, the views of other nations, however enlightened the Justices
of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon Americans
through the Constitution."'
Recently, Justice Kennedy's notable opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas65 cited a decision of the European Court of Human Rights in sup-
port of his position rejecting the precedent established in Bowers v.
Hardwick:66
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civiliza-
tion, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have
been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has
58. Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring).
59. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
60. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
61. Id. at 324-25 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 325 (citing Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 (1989)).
63. Id. at 347-48 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 348 (citing Justice Scalia's dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69
n.4 (1988)).
65. 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483 (2003).
66. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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followed not Bowers but its own decision in Dudgeon v. United King-
dom. . . . Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in
intimate, consensual conduct.6 7
In his dissent, Justice Scalia refers to Canadian judicial legalization
of homosexual marriage in rebuttal of Kennedy's assertion that it will
not happen in the United States.68 While it is conceivable that the judi-
ciary may become more open to considerations of foreign values
through analyses of customary international law, the courts remain
strongly opposed to the citation of foreign law in the area of human
rights. Our current legal climate is nowhere near a point at which the
courts would accept such law as dispositive.
3. How DID WE GET HERE?
The legacy of the twentieth century is that we in the United States
have mainly a tenuous and formalistic relationship to the international
human rights system. To see why this is so, apart from ordinary politics,
we must turn to the underlying premises and traditions of American con-
stitutionalism. Our continuing reluctance to participate in the interna-
tional human rights regime is not primarily the result of U.S. foreign
policy isolationism, xenophobia or imperialistic hubris, though all of
these elements have played a role. I believe that our dilemma runs much
deeper and has, alas, more respectable constitutionalist roots.
The first aspect of this dilemma is our peculiarly strong textualist
constitutional tradition. In the 1780s, the United States produced two of
the world's first written national constitutions in the Articles of Confed-
eration (1771-1781) and the Constitution of the United States (1787-
1788), but our earlier colonial tradition also had rested heavily on
authoritative texts: the great British constitutional texts and the several
colonial charters. The irony is, of course, that American constitutional
textualism developed with the nurturing of the world's oldest and most
important tradition of unwritten constitutionalism. Our present gov-
erning document was adopted in 1787 and it has barely been changed
during the past two centuries. This is not to say that the meanings given
to the remarkably small number of words in the Constitution have not
substantially changed over time. Whatever our politics or ideology,
however, Americans seek desperately to justify our beliefs and actions
by reference to the Constitution's text. It is not going too far to say that
we have nearly sacralized both the constitutional text and the Bill of
Rights; the original copy stored in the National Archives Building in
67. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2483.
68. Id. at 2497.
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Washington, D.C., is protected by gas in a chamber that can quickly be
lowered into a disaster-resistant tomb!
Historian Eric Hobsbawm recently attributed "the deliberate resis-
tance to change of American public institutions"69 to our textual consti-
tutional tradition: "Forced into the straitjacket of an 18th century
Constitution reinforced by two centuries of Talmudic exegesis by law-
yers, the theologians of the republic, the institutions of the U.S.A. are far
more frozen into immobility than those of almost all other states."7°
Moreover, we are not only committed to a brief and somewhat
cryptic text, but we have submitted ourselves to the primacy of judicial
interpretation of that text. Louis Henkin noted that from the earliest days
of Chief Justice John Marshall's assertion of judicial control of constitu-
tional interpretation, "[t]he text became all; what was written is the
effective constitution. The Justices ... felt constrained to look only to
the text; what was not there was excluded.' So we have a short, long-
standing, judicially interpreted text. The text, one must also note, has
seldom been amended, so restrictive were the provisions of Article V
specifying the amendment process. None of this had to be so, but it is
the constitutional tradition we have built, sustained and accepted.
I am not, however, trying to make an originalist argument.
Although we have barely changed the constitutional text, we have of
course introduced many innovations by way of judicial interpretation
and acquiescence to novel changes in practice. There is an obvious dis-
tinction to be made between our essential constitutionalism (of which
textualism is an integral part) and our constitutional tradition - as a mat-
ter of contingent fact, the way things constitutional turn out at a given
point in time. Our constitutional tradition has witnessed extraordinary
(and totally extra-textual) changes in relations between the states and the
federal government (the Commerce Clause), between the executive and
the legislature (the War Powers), and in the creation of wholly new
processes and entities of government (administrative law and the Air
Force), to name just a few. Constitutional practice changes, and with it
the way the republic governs itself must change. There is no logical
reason American constitutional tradition could not embrace international
human rights ideals - no built-in structural resistance exists. But in
fact, the tradition has failed us when it comes to human rights.
Thus, I simply want to suggest that our textualism is a sort of
anchor to windward, inhibiting innovation, especially when constitu-
69. Eric Hobsbawm, Only in America, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., July 4, 2003, at B9.
70. Id.
71. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 90, n.7 (1990) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)).
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tional changes trigger atavistic political responses. Textualism impels us
to question, and sometimes to challenge, innovations that might other-
wise be much easier to accept. The textualist tradition is more instinc-
tive than rational, and makes it very hard to gain constitutional
acceptance for ideas and practices that are rooted neither in the text nor
found in our lived traditions. Insofar as human rights are concerned,
textualism interacts with both Washingtonian fears of "foreign entangle-
ment" and Anti-Federalist resistance to the aggrandizement of the gov-
ernment in Washington at the time of the Constitution's ratification.
The second element in the dilemma of American constitutionalism
has been its close association with popular sovereignty. The United
States may not have invented modem constitutionalism (although, as I
have argued elsewhere, I think we did), but we surely innovated the
formal relationship between constitutionalism and popular sovereignty.
Here the central idea was that of ratification. In the American tradition,
we rigidly separate the functions of legislation and constitution-making,
as opposed to the legislative constitution-making approaches of most
contemporary parliamentary/civil law countries.72 The American sys-
tem requires specially elected bodies to propose constitutional texts, and
either separate ratifying bodies or submission of the texts to the electo-
rate for approval.
As Gordon Wood has demonstrated in his Creation of the Ameri-
can Republic 1776-1787, a radical theory of the derivation of the Consti-
tution directly from the sovereign people was necessary to defend the
politically contrived Constitution from Anti-Federalist charges that an
anti-populist convention had stolen government from the people.73 Fed-
eralist writers like James Wilson, speaking in the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, made the point explicit, arguing that the legitimate source
of power did not come from state governments, "for in truth, it remains
and flourishes with the people."74 He contended that the source of legiti-
mate power ". . . resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of govem-
ment."75 "Who will undertake to say as a state officer that the people
may not give to the general government what powers and for what pur-
poses they please? How comes it ... that these State governments dic-
tate to their superiors? - to the majesty of the people?"76
Despite the fact that the people (as opposed to the judiciary) have
been so little involved in formal constitution-making in modem Ameri-
72. Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in Europe and the U.S. Bill of
Rights, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PRO1s. 223, 224-25 (2002).
73. GORDON S. WOOD, CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 344-89 (1998).
74. Id. at 530-31.
75. Id. (emphasis in original).
76. Id. at 531.
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can history, the historic Federalist sense of the tight fit between popular
sovereignty and constitutional validity makes it hard for Americans to
acknowledge the constitutional legitimacy of even the most admirable
foreign constitutional institutions and norms. We simply do not accept
that the United Nations or any other international body embodies the
will of the American people sufficiently for it to establish rules enforce-
able in American courts. We are all Brickerites, to this extent, espe-
cially wary of the possibility that exogenous norms will be bootstrapped
into the domestic order, by treaty, executive agreement, or otherwise.
This is an integral part of the American constitutional personality that is
increasingly in tension with the globalism of higher values. For Ameri-
cans, international human rights, as they might be assimilated into our
Constitution, threaten the creation of a disturbing democratic deficit -
which is really to put Senator Bricker's basic intuition into polite lan-
guage. For most Americans, the adoption of such important values (at
least insofar as they are new values) requires a formal constitutional act
invoking popular sovereignty. We do, after all, have an available consti-
tutional mechanism to support international human rights. But, effective
constitutionalism anywhere depends on the continuing support of the
people for its underlying values. Whether in the United States such sup-
port for the broadest forms of universal human rights exists or can be
created through politics or programs of public education is a separate
question that would need to be investigated in any fuller discussion of
this problem. It is hard to believe that such support exists at the present
moment.
The third factor in the dilemma of U.S. constitutionalism that
makes it difficult for Americans to buy into the international norms is
our sharply defined and somewhat idiosyncratic rights tradition. The
American nation emerged out of a struggle for "the rights of English-
men," 77 and it briefly articulated its understanding of rights as natural
rights in the Preamble to the Declaration of Independence. But, much
more significantly, as Gerald Stourzh has recently pointed out, the
Americans innovated by "constitutionalizing the rights of persons."
This was a dual process:
On the one hand, natural rights were reduced, if one may put it this
way, to the level of constitutional rights - what German authors have
called die Positivierung des Naturrechts (the positivizing of natural
law).... On the other hand, the process of "constitutionalizing" indi-
vidual rights also included the raising of various rights of English
77. Gerald Stourzh, Liberal Democracy as a Culture of Rights: England, the United States
and Continental Europe, in BRIDGING THE ATLANTIC: THE QUESTION OF AMERICAN
EXCEPTIONALISM IN PERSPECTIVE 15-16 (Elisabeth Glaser & Hermann Wellenreuther eds., 2002).
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common law or parliamentary origin, particularly procedural rights,
to the level of constitutional rights.7"
In other words, by the time we adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791, we
had narrowed our rights orientation to that narrow set of rights explicitly
written into the first amendments to the Constitution.
The process of constitutionalization limits our conception of rights
to those listed in, or construed from, the Bill of Rights, which are almost
entirely negative in character. The problem after the Revolution, after
all, was to protect the rights of Englishmen from incursions by our own
government, and the Bill of Rights was primarily aimed at preventing
governmental abuse of the rights of citizens. To be sure, some rights are
stated positively (the free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and the
press, and the right to bear arms), but the form of each guarantee is one
against the government. For Americans, the Bill of Rights says to the
state, "Thou shall not" - or, more specifically - "Congress shall make
no law. ... " And of course the mysterious Ninth Amendment assures us
(as it was intended to assure the Anti-Federalists) that "[t]he enumera-
tion in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."79 So while in principle the
first eight amendments do not claim to be exclusive or exhaustive, in
reality American constitutional parsimoniousness and textuality have not
admitted of the judicial creation of numerous new constitutional rights.
Even the Reconstruction Amendments, and in particular the Fourteenth
Amendment, have not introduced many broad new rights, and none that
is a positive right. As I argued some years ago, the guarantee of "equal
protection" of the laws is a far cry from a mandate of "equality,"
whereas normative equality undergirds the structure of much of interna-
tional human rights law.8°
The distinctiveness and limitations of our negative rights tradition
did not become fully apparent until a half-century ago, when the begin-
nings of the end of the old American racial order and the emergence of a
limited welfare state brought with them demands for positive economic
and social rights. The quasi-egalitarian impact of the Warren Court's
ruling in Brown v. Board of Education8 aroused hopes in many (and
fears in many others) that its ratio decidendi would be extended far
beyond race, and at least in the 1960s many new Brown-based rights did
emerge. But the rights revolution, seen in retrospect, was basically a
strong movement toward civil rights, with scant impact on social and,
78. Id. at 27.
79. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
80. Stanley N. Katz, The Strange Birth and Unlikely History of Constitutional Equality, 75 J.
AM. KiST. 747 (1988).
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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especially, economic rights. Progress was made in those areas through
legislation, but there is in the United States a big constitutional differ-
ence between statutory entitlement programs and rights-based programs.
For the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has been moving in direc-
tions that are hardly suggestive of the creation of even modest versions
of the social or economic rights that are idealized in some of the most
important international human rights agreements.
It is perhaps worth noting at this point that a central ambiguity has
historically characterized the American rights tradition. This was origi-
nally revealed in the paradox of the slaveholder Thomas Jefferson and
the Continental Congress proclaiming the universality of the rights of
man in the Declaration of Independence. The ambiguity was then nega-
tively written into the text of the Constitution through the several provi-
sions taking slavery into account (and thus giving slavery constitutional
status) in which the word "slave" nowhere appears. Stourzh has
observed, "[T]he culture of rights in the United States draws its peculiar
intensity and poignancy from the fact that in no other liberal democracy
... have the affirmation of human rights and their denial been as closely
adjacent to each other. '82 We have subsequently had to be careful not to
claim too much for the entrenchment of rights.
Now, of course, there are substantive reasons quite apart from our
constitutional tradition that the United States has been, at best, reluctant
to create positive rights - our weak state tradition, our historic antago-
nism toward socialism, our tradition of liberal individualism, and so
forth. But these all move in the direction of middle of the road liberal
economic democracy, a tendency that was strengthened dramatically
during the Cold War. Franklin Delano Roosevelt may have hoped to
constitutionalize the New Deal when he included "Freedom from Want"
as one of the Four Freedoms, but despite Mrs. Roosevelt's tireless effort
to include it in the U.N. human rights documents, the principle cannot
seriously be considered a part of our constitutional tradition.
The constitutional version of the Cold War was a conflict between
the forces of civil and political rights and those of social and economic
rights. We in the West argued that if free market-based democracies
ensured political and civil rights, they would then move in the direction
of a prosperity that would benefit all sectors of society. The commu-
nists, on the other hand, argued that it would only be if the state could
guarantee such rights as those of jobs, housing and health care that a
decent society could be created. "You can't eat votes," we were told.
Apart from Cuba, there are few places where the communist constitu-
tional claim is still maintained, but it has long been the case that the
82. Stourzh, supra note 78, at 29.
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underdeveloped and postcolonial world has accepted the primacy of pos-
itive, social and economic rights. The point here is simply that, to
American ears, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights still sounds dangerously similar to the Soviet position on
rights, however widely supported the position now may be. We say
they are the same old social and economic rights, and we say "to hell
with them." This position is, for better or worse, as American as apple
pie, and it constitutes an independent source of the U.S. human rights
dilemma. To be fair, it is sometimes the case that American rights prac-
tices are superior - our legally enforceable norms are stronger than their
international human rights analogues. But it may also be fair to say that
Americans are particularly prone to "rights ethnocentricity." We tend to
think that our historic conception of rights is the only valid conception,
or at least that it is the best approach to constitutional rights. This is not
likely to change anytime soon.
4. WHERE ARE WE GOING?
But some (and I have in mind Louis Henkin in his fine volume The
Age of Rights)83 would argue that I take too narrow and limited a view
of the American rights tradition. Henkin would stress not only that the
Bill of Rights is, by its own terms, not limited to the rights expressly
enumerated therein, but that we have a prior and more important rights
tradition in the Declaration of Independence. Henkin makes the excep-
tionally broad claim that the "ideas declared by Jefferson in 1776 consti-
tute ... the theory of American constitutionalism.1
84
Though we think of our Constitution as Madisonian (and in important
respects Hamiltonian), our idea of rights is Jeffersonian: The idea of
rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence is reflected in
the constitutional text. But the jurisprudence we have spun out of that
text has lagged behind and diverged from Jeffersonian principles. In
the growth of that jurisprudence, text and canonical exegesis have
dominated, but theory has been at best assumed, often neglected or
abandoned. The reasons for the divergence of doctrine from theory
are complex. I cite two: We became committed to constitutional text
and to the judicial remedy for monitoring it; and, as regards rights,
the text was - is - deficient.85
As you have seen, I agree with Henkin's analysis of the problem
but not with his solution for it, since it carries the idea of Jeffersonian
constitutionalism far beyond anything Jefferson ever said and has no
83. Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1990).
84. Id. at 84.
85. Id. at 90.
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roots in the historical American experience. Henkin imagines a remarka-
ble Jeffersonian constitutional world:
For Jefferson, [however], the social compact was a contract among
all persons constituting the people, and between each person and the
people, to respect each other's rights and to create institutions to
secure those rights; the compact also includes the conditions that gov-
ern the government to assure that it respects our rights .... A com-
plete Jeffersonian constitution would have included an agreement
among the people to respect each other's rights, including their equal-
ity; an agreement that the government to be created would respect
those fights, including equality; an agreement that not only authorizes
but requires government to protect every person from actions by his
or her neighbor as well as from official actions that deny individual
rights, including equality. 86
Henkin concludes that the Bill of Rights contains all the Jefferso-
nian rights save equality (a biggie, I might note), though he feels sure
that the commanding Jeffersonian conception of the social compact does
not allow for the welfare state. At this point, I lose Henkin completely,
but it is clear that the reason he is driven to such historical broad con-
structionism is that he cannot find positive rights anywhere else in our
constitutional tradition. My argument is that he cannot find them
because they are not yet there.
And thus concludeth the sermon. I have tried to argue that we
should not be surprised that the United States has been the most reluc-
tant of the post-industrial democracies to participate in the international
human rights regime. Our Constitution is virtually unamendable. Our
rights tradition is mostly text-based, negative in character and limited to
civil and political rights. But even our undoubted commitment to civil
and political rights cannot offset our attachment to popular constitutional
sovereignty. Henkin argues that this need not be an impediment to
American participation in the international system:
Necessarily, however, the idea of fights reflected in the instruments
[of international human fights], the particular rights recognized, and
the consequent responsibilities for political societies, imply particular
political ideas and moral principles. International human rights does
not hint at any theory of social contract, but it is committed to popu-
lar sovereignty. "The will of the people shall be the basis of the
authority of government" and is to "be expressed in periodic and gen-
uine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage." 87
Logically, Henkin is correct, but I fear that he underestimates the
vibrancy of American constitutional particularism.
86. Id. at 95.
87. Id. at 7 (quoting U.N. Charter art. 21, para. 3).
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Our dilemma is that, by our own lights, we are too thoroughly con-
stitutionalist (in the American way) to make international human rights a
matter of domestic jurisdiction. I recognize that there are less admirable
reasons why we hold ourselves apart. But if we are to sign on more
fully to international human rights, we will have to rethink and reinvent
some basic elements of our constitutional legacy and derive new strate-
gies for constitutional action. More important, we will have to struggle
to build a domestic political constituency in favor of constitutionalizing
international human rights norms that satisfies American popular sover-
eignty sensibilities, unless one thinks that a sufficiently powerful free-
standing political human rights constituency can be built to somehow
obviate the constitutional barriers. For the moment, I am not optimistic
that we are up to such challenges.
